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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the determining reasons of the differences among 
the Italian regions in matter of investment in workers’ training. Training 
incidence in Italy is not homogeneous among regions, with a lower intensity 
in the South. Two not alternative explanations are proposed at a theoretical 
level and tested by econometric estimates, referring to the complementarity 
between education and training and to the effects of regional 
unemployment. Both hypotheses, as the results show, are upheld by 
empirical estimates, based on the European Community Households Panel. 
In our results educational level appear to be important as it affects the 
choice made by the firm of which workers to offer an opportunity of 
training, whereas unemployment rate and wage compression affect the 
decision of how many workers to train. The unemployment effect found out 
by this paper confirms that, as it has been pointed out by most recent 
developments of human capital literature, the firms incentives to pay for 
general training depend on the level of wage compression. Notwithstanding 
it represents an original result as compression in this model doesn’t depend 
on institutional factors, as usually assumed in the literature, but on the 
dependence of unskilled wage on regional unemployment. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper analyses the determining reasons of the differences among 
the Italian regions in matter of investment in workers’ training. In particular, 
training provided to employed workers is considered as distinguished from 
education. As we show afterwards, training incidence in Italy is not 
homogeneous among regions, with a lower intensity in the South. Two 
hypotheses are considered in this paper which can attempt to explain these 
differences. 
The first hypothesis considers that workers’ training levels depend 
positively on their educational levels. Complementarity between education 
and training is founded on the idea that knowledge obtained through 
education facilitates learning and helps to valorise the further skills acquired 
on the job (Rosen 1976, Brunello 2001, Ariga and Brunello 2002). Even 
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though this effect results to be relevant, it is not sufficient to explain the 
differentials in training among the Italian regions. Therefore further 
explicative factors must be considered. The second hypothesis we formulate 
assumes that training can depend on the regional labour market conditions 
as well. We verify if and in which way the structural differences among 
regional labour markets weigh on training investments. The mechanism we 
formalize in the model, assumes that the unemployment of unskilled 
workforce influences the wage structure, downward pressing the unskilled 
wage and, consequently, widening the unskilled/skilled wage differential. 
Through this channel, labour markets conditions impinge on the firms 
incentives to train. In short, unemployment can hold down the private 
training investments. This hypothesis is based on the most recent results of 
literature on training in imperfect labour markets (Acemoglu and Pischke 
1998, Stevens 1994 and 1996, Booth and Bryan 2002) and constitutes an 
original application to the Italian case. Both hypotheses, as the results show, 
are upheld by empirical estimates, based on the European Community 
Households Panel. The results demonstrate that both the workforce 
characteristics and the conditions of regional labour markets – in addition to 
other likely factors, as industrial and technological structure of the economy 
- are relevant in determining training investments. The differences in the 
regional training policies should be considered as well, however, given the 
common institutional framework, we may think that they have less weight 
in a cross-region analysis than in a cross-country one. 
In the second paragraph the model is presented, while in the third one 
we show some empirical evidences on training activities, education and 
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unemployment levels in Italian regions. In the fourth paragraph the results 
of econometric estimates results are reported and discussed. At last some 
implications are pointed out in the fifth paragraph. 
 
2. A model of training incidence in regional labour markets with 
different educational levels and unemployment rates  
The model presented in this section shows a mechanism which 
determines different training incidence rates in regions with not 
homogeneous workforce and unemployment rates. It analyses training 
offered by firms and the choice they make of how many and which workers 
to train. Recent studies on human capital prove that firms pay for general 
training (see Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Stevens 1996 and the review in 
Croce 2004) because of labour market competitive imperfections broadly 
due to institutional factors. So scholars have compared countries with 
different labour market and training institutions. Institutional explanations 
can have a not negligible role also in a cross-region analysis in Italy. 
However, given the common institutional framework, we need to inquire 
into further explanatory economic factors. In particular, this paper considers 
the role of the workforce educational levels and that of the regional 
unemployment rates. A higher level of education provides polyvalent 
knowledge requested to foster learning abilities and a better exploitation of 
skills gained by training. Scholars have already pointed out 
complementarity between education and training. Brunello (2001) and Ariga 
and Brunello (2002) observe that there is technical complementarity 
between them when a higher level of education increases training 
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productivity. In this paper we introduce a simple specification of worker’s 
productivity in which this condition is satisfied and demonstrate that the 
individual educational level is a major indicator adopted by firms in order to 
select the workforce to whom offer training. A worker is defined skilled 
(unskilled) when he has been trained (or not) in a firm when in employment, 
apart from his educational level. Unemployment rates are assumed to be 
different across regions and heavily concentrated on unskilled workers. Both 
these hypotheses, as shown in the following paragraph, are realistic if 
compared with the Italian situation. In this model the regional 
unemployment level, weighing upon unskilled workers’ wages, determines 
the unskilled/skilled wage differential, on which the willingness of firms to 
invest in training depends. Therefore, while in the original theory of human 
capital unemployment depresses workers’ investments in general training, in 
this model unskilled workers’ unemployment is relevant for firms 
investments. De Paola and Scoppa (2001) as well consider the firms choice 
in matter of training depending on the unemployment level. They do have a 
different perspective, however, as they consider the case of skilled workers’ 
unemployment and analyse its effects on the choice between internal 
training and external recruitment of skilled workers. Whereas we assume 
that unemployment of skilled workforce (that is workers with professional 
background and expertise), contrary to the unskilled workforce 
unemployment, is a relatively limited phenomenon. Empirical evidence 
suggests the existence in Italy of wide skill shortages. This is moreover 
coherent with the analyses on the effects of the technological change. These 
argue that the diffusion of new technologies has increased the demand of 
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skilled labour causing, as a consequence, a widening of the wage 
differentials in the US economy and an increase of unskilled unemployment 
in the continental European countries, characterized by a lesser wage 
elasticity. In such a situation it is not an easy task for firms to recruit skilled 
workers because of the relative lack of them in the labour market. In these 
conditions the firm can hire unskilled workers and has to choose whether 
employ them as they are or train them.  
2.1. Model set up 
The firm can employ both unskilled and skilled workers. They are 
substitutes but the skilled workers are more productive than unskilled ones. 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there are constant returns to scale. 
Firms are assumed to be identical. Two periods are considered omitting time 
discounting to simplify.  
Hypothesis 1. We do not consider, in this model, the chance of 
recruiting skilled workers, so that the firm can hire only unskilled workers. 
At the beginning of the first period every firm hires the same number N of 
employees. Labour supply is inelastic. The company can offer each worker 
either a job without or with training: therefore the firm must decide how 
many and whom offer a job with training. The worker may accept or refuse 
the firm offer. In case of refusal the firm is ready to employ him as 
unskilled. 
Hypothesis 2. The human capital acquired by training is of a general 
kind and it is indivisible, so that it always values 1 in case of training or 0 
without it. Following Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), we assume that direct 
costs for training are borne by firms because of a credit constraint that 
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prevents employees to overburden them. However the worker bears indirect 
costs, corresponding to the lost wage in the training period. Training per 
capita direct cost is constant, equal to 0>c . 
Hypothesis 3. Workers’ productivity depends not only on their 
endowment of human capital – acquired through training and education – 
but also on the technological characteristics of the jobs. Unskilled workers 
are employed in unqualified jobs where knowledge acquired through 
education is useless, so that their productivity equals ( )0a , independent 
from education and constant over the two periods.  
Hypothesis 4. On the contrary, in case of employment with training, 
the first period is for training (without output and wage), while in the second 
one the skilled worker is employed for production purposes. His 
productivity is equal to ( ) ( )01 aha >i , where hi measures the pre-training 
productivity of the i-th worker, positively dependent on his educational 
level. We assume  [ ]+-Î hhh ;  with h- e h+ respectively equals to the 
minimum and maximum values of h, that is distributed as the distribution 
function ( )hF , where ( ) ( )HprobHF <= h . As h directly depends on the 
educational level, it is perfectly observed by firms. With identical firms 
recruiting in the regional labour market, the distribution of the workforce 
pre-training productivity levels is the same in every one of them.  
Hypothesis 5. Unskilled wage is determined in labour market as a 
negative function of the unemployment rate. The labour market 
imperfections cause an equilibrium unemployment u of unskilled labour, 
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with their wage given by ( )uwˆ , with 0'ˆ <w  and 0"ˆ >w  (Blanchflower and 
Oswald 1994)1.  
Hypothesis 6. The wage paid to the skilled worker in the second period 
is ( ) ( )uwwi ˆ1 > . Moreover, as in Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) we make the 
hypothesis that ( ) ( )11 ii w>ha  from which descends that the firm realizes a 
surplus when it employs a skilled worker. This represents a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for the firm to invest in workers’ general training.  
Hypothesis 7. At the beginning of the second period the skilled 
workers quit the firm according to an exogenous turnover rate q.  The wage 
that a skilled worker can gain in an external firm is ( ) iv h1 , with  
( ) ( ) ( )11ˆ ii wvuw << h . 
2.2. The skilled worker’s  wage 
At the beginning of the second period the skilled workers who don’t 
quit the company can one by one bargain the second period wage ( )1iw , as 
their employment gives rise to the surplus ( ) ( ) 011 >- ii wha . Bargaining 
follows, given risk neutrality of the players, the Nash scheme. The firm 
payoff deriving from the employment of a skilled worker is 
( ) ( ) 0)0(11 >-- pha ii w , where ( )0p  represents the second period profit if 
the bargaining fails. As to the worker his payoff is ( ) ( ) ii vw h11 - . The 
bargained wage results from the first order condition for the maximization 
of the product 
                                                 
1 Even in presence of centralized bargaining institutions, the existence of regional wage 
differentials in Italy and their sensitivity to regional unemployment cannot be excluded and 
are objects of debate (see for instance Casavola et al., 1995, and Contini et al., 2000). 
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( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( )[ ]bb hha iiii vww 1111 1 -- -                                                            [1] 
where  b   measures the worker’s bargaining power ( )10 ££ b  and  ( ) 00 =p  
to simplify2. The bargained wage is therefore equal to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] iii vvw habh 1111 -+=                                                                 [2] 
In this expression training cost is not considered because bargaining 
occurs when the cost has been already borne. The wage ( )1iw  is known by 
the players since the beginning of the first period and it is also the only 
credible wage for workers. In fact, if a wage rate above that level would be 
announced by the firm at the beginning of the first period in order to attract 
more high-productive workers, they would consider it unreliable as they 
anticipate that the firm would be able to refuse to pay a wage exceeding [2] 
in the second period. 
2.3.The firm 
At the beginning of the first period the firm must decide which 
employment offer to each worker, comparing his expected gain in case of 
training with the one without training. Therefore the following condition can 
be derived  
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] cwquw ii ---£- 111ˆ02 haa                                                 [3] 
where the term on the left of the inequality represents the two periods profit 
without training while that on the right represents the expected profit with 
training. [3] represents the necessary and sufficient condition that must be 
satisfied for investment in general training to be profitable for the firm 
                                                 
2 We exclude from the analysis the case of workers’ collusion, which would imply a higher 
workers’ bargaining power and different values of the parameters in the bargaining 
solution. 
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while, as mentioned previously, ( ) ( ) 011 >- ii wha  is only a necessary 
condition. By substituting [2] in [3] we obtain: 
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] Rvq
cuw
i º---
+-
³
1111
ˆ202
ab
ah                                                                  [4] 
2.4 The worker  
Given [4], a worker with a ‘low’ level of pre-training productivity, that 
is hi <R, can receive only job offers without training. If he refuses such an 
offer, he can be hired by another firm in the same period with probability 
equal to u-1  but, as firms are identical, he would receive a similar offer by 
whatever external firm, given his level hi. So the expected gain for the two 
periods in case of refusal is ( ) ( )uwu ˆ12 - , with zero income in case of 
unemployment to simplify. Consequently the worker chooses to accept a job 
without training (even if he would prefer one with training). 
When the firm offers a job with training the worker decides whether to 
accept or not, comparing the expected earnings from a job with or without 
training, and considering that in case of refusal he could be employed in the 
same firm as unskilled. So the following condition must be satisfied in order 
that the worker accepts: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ii qvwquw h111ˆ2 +-£                                                                     [5] 
where the term on the left represents the earnings of the unskilled worker, 
while that on the right represents the expected earnings by the skilled 
worker, equal to the sum of the internal and external wages weighted by the 
respective probabilities. By substituting [2] in [5] we obtain: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] Svqv
uw
i º--+
³
1111
ˆ2
ab
h                                                               [6] 
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2.5 How many and which workers are trained 
Condition [4] shows that firms offer an employment with training to 
every worker satisfying the condition Ri ³h  and only to them. Whereas the 
condition [6] establishes that the workers who accept this offer are all and 
the only ones for whom the condition  Si ³h  is verified. The percentage of 
workers who receive an offer of training is therefore given by  
( ) ( )RprobRF i ³=- h1 .                                                                         [7] 
This shows that firms make selective offers of training, choosing 
people whose pre-training productivity is at least equal to the threshold R. 
That is the firms prefer highly educated workers to train. As to the workers, 
the percentage of them aiming at receiving training is equal to  
( ) ( )SprobSF i ³=- h1                                                                            [8] 
that includes sufficiently highly educated workers whose pre-training 
productivity is at least equal to the threshold S. 
Finally, the following “global” condition for training can be 
established, reflecting the fact that the firm must offer training and the 
worker must accept it in order that it takes place 
( )SRMaxi ,* =³hh                                                                                  [9] 
which implies that training incidence rate equates ( )*1 hF- . 
2.6 Educational levels, unemployment and training by the firms. 
The obtained results imply that an increase of workforce educational 
levels, which means a more concentrated distribution ( )hF  towards 
relatively high levels of h, determines, ceteris paribus, a higher value of 
both ( )RF-1  and ( )SF-1 , that is a greater propensity of firms and 
 11 
workers to training. The “global” condition [9] also implies that in all cases 
in which R¹S we have a rationing of training that hits firms or workers 
depending on the sign of the inequality. From [4] and [6] it is possible to 
determine the unskilled unemployment rate u* such that R=S. However, 
since the unemployment rate is exogenous in this model, this only occurs at 
random, while u¹u* has to be expected. Therefore we may distinguish two 
cases. In the first we have  u<u* and, consequently, R<S which implies that 
firms turn out to be rationed in the chance of carrying out their training 
plans3. In the second, we have u>u* and R>S that implies, on the contrary, a 
workers’ training propensity greater than the firms’ one. These two cases of 
training rationing can usefully stylise the divergence between different 
regional areas in Italy. The first case, that could be labelled as “North East 
pattern”, shows the situation of many local labour markets of the north-
eastern regions, where, in presence of low unemployment rates, the firms 
find difficult to fill all the positions open to apprentices, because young 
people consider them scarcely gainful (Frey and others 2003). The second, 
on the contrary, with high unemployment rates and a lower training activity 
promoted by firms, could be labelled as “South pattern“, as it resembles the 
situation of southern labour markets. 
                                                 
3  A possible implication of the case R<S not developed in this paper, but that is worth to 
mention, is the following. In this case, if the hypothesis that the bargaining wage is the only 
credible is removed, the firms could be motivated to increase the skilled wage over the 
bargained level in order to make training attractive for a greater number of workers. The 
wage would be determined by the maximization of profits, considering that a higher wage 
corresponds to a greater number of skilled workers, but also to a lower profit margin for 
each one of them (an analogous situation is analysed, for instance, by Stevens 1996). The 
increase of skilled wage, reducing firms incentive to train and increasing the workers’ one, 
would continue up to the level that equalizes R and S so to make their choices coinciding. 
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On the basis of the obtained results the unemployment effect (u) is not 
univocal. In fact, [4] shows that a higher u reduces the unskilled wage and 
makes training relatively less profitable for firms. On the other side, an 
increase of u and the subsequent reduction of unskilled wage make the 
training more gainful for workers, as from [6]. So the sign of the net effect 
of an increase of u on the share of workforce entering training depends on 
the sign of the inequality between R and S. As long as R<S an increase 
(reduction) of u reduces (increases) S and causes, ceteris paribus, an 
increase (reduction) of the regional training incidence rate ( )*1 hF- . While 
with R>S an increase (reduction) of u, reduces (increases) the training 
incidence through the effect on R. 
The unemployment effect found out by this model determines results 
similar to those by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), as it confirms that the 
incentive for firms to pay for general training arises and increases with 
regard to the level of wage compression. Notwithstanding it represents an 
original result as compression in this model doesn’t depend on institutional 
factors, as usually assumed in literature, but on the dependence of unskilled 
wage on regional unemployment. 
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3. Training, education and unemployment levels: some empirical 
evidences 
The available information shows differences in the quantity of training 
provided across regions. From the CVTS2 survey, that considers only firms 
with at least 10 employees, the percentage of training-firms in the South is 
15,4%, below the national average of 23,9% (tab. 1). The training gap is 
wider in services sector, with 13,3% for the South and 24,8% for Italy. In 
the North-East the training-firms reach the percentage of 27,5% (30,2% in 
services). The territorial gap in training activities is relevant in all firms 
sizes, while vanishes only when over 500 employees. Excelsior data 
confirm this picture, even if on a different scale, due to a larger survey 
sample (including all firms with at least one employee) and to the more 
limited kinds of training activities considered (more innovative and less 
formal activities are excluded). The percentage of training-firms in the 
South is 9,4% (tab. 2), while the one in North-East reaches 13,2%. The 
percentages of trained workers on total dependents in all firms reveals 
similar contrasts between regions. 
Table 3 shows education levels in different areas. The relative 
numbers of upper secondary and tertiary degree on total labour force in the 
South are below the levels of the Centre, on the same levels of the North-
west and above those of the North-east. This evidence suggests that the 
hypothesis of complementarity between education and training cannot 
explain the training gap between regions, as North-east and South exhibit 
similar levels of education and large differences in training incidence rates.  
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Tab. 1 - Percentage of firms offering continuous training, Italy – 1999 
 North West North East Centre  South Italy 
Industry 26.1 25.1 19.3 17.0 23.3 
Constructions 18.3 31.0 31.4 16.9 23.7 
Services 27.6 30.2 23.5 13.3 24.8 
10-19 employees 16.2 19.5 16.2 11.2 16.3 
20-49 employees 33.5 35.0 25.6 19.9 30.1 
50-249 employees 51.8 50.0 50.6 28.8 47.8 
250-499 employees 82.4 80.1 76.9 53.9 77.8 
500-999 employees 77.9 87.8 79.5 86.1 81.4 
More than 1000  95.4 94.0 84.5 90.5 92.7 
Total 25.9 27.5 22.4 15.4 23.9 
Source: Eurostat-CVTS2. Various training methods considered, excluded employment-
training contracts and apprenticeship. 
 
 
Tab. 2 - Percentage of firms offering continuous training and 
percentage of trained workers on total dependents in all firms, 
Excelsior, Italy – 2000 
 North West North East Centre  South Italy 
% of firms 
1-9 dependents 10.7 11.3 10.4 8.4 10.3 
10-49 dependents 19.8 20.2 15.8 15.0 18.3 
50-249 dependents 37.9 38.6 31.7 24.3 34.9 
250 dependents and more 85.8 90.7 85.5 91.7 87.8 
Total 12.6 13.2 11.5 9.4 11.9 
% of dependents 
1-9 dependents 3.4 3.7 3.4 3.2 3.4 
10-49 dependents 5.4 5.3 4.3 5.0 5.1 
50-249 dependents 9.5 9.0 8.9 7.3 8.9 
250 dependents and more 23.3 25.8 24.0 27.2 24.6 
Total 11.2 10.7 10.4 9.7 10.6 
Source: Unioncamere-Excelsior. Excluded employment-training contracts and 
apprenticeship. 
 
 
Table 3, in order to draw the attention to the huge differences in labour 
market conditions, reports the employment and unemployment rates per 
area. The unemployment rate of the South (27,9 %) results to be more than 
five times the one of the North-East (4,6%). 
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Tab. 3 – Educational levels and regional labour markets, Italy - 1999 
 North West North East Centre  South 
Upper second. lev./ labour 30.1% 27.2% 34.1% 30.0% 
Tertiary level/labour forces 9.7% 8.1% 11.1% 9.6% 
Employment rate 57.8% 58.7% 55.6% 40.3% 
Unemployment rate 6.7% 4.6% 9.7% 27.9% 
Source: Labour Force Survey, ISTAT, average 1999 
 
Tab. 4 – Unemployment rates by work experience and educational 
qualifications, Italy, Istat - 1999 
Unemployed Educational qualification 
first job 
seekers  
with work 
experience 
Age £40 
years  
Age>40 
years  
Total 
Italy 
Tertiary educ. and more 6.4 2.3 15.3 1.2 8.7 
Upper secondary education 8.4 5.0 18.1 3.2 13.4 
Compulsory education 6.2 9.1 21.1 8.4 15.4 
Total 7.1 6.7 19.2 5.9 13.8 
North-Centre 
Tertiary educ. and more 4.5 2.2 11.3 1.3 6.7 
Upper secondary education 3.6 3.9 9.9 2.2 7.5 
Compulsory education 2.1 5.7 10.9 4.5 7.9 
Total 3.0 4.6 10.5 3.4 7.6 
South-Islands 
Tertiary educ. and more 10.5 2.7 25.9 1.2 13.2 
Upper secondary education 20.1 7.7 38.1 5.6 27.7 
Compulsory education 13.5 15.1 38.5 15.9 28.6 
Total 15.4 11.2 37.2 11.1 26.7 
Source: Labour Force Survey, ISTAT, average 1999 
 
Table 4 shows the prevalent presence of unskilled workers in 
unemployment in both macro-area. Despite the increase number of 
temporary contracts, the largest part of unemployed is constituted of first 
job seekers (7,1% as compared to the 6,7% of unemployed with work 
experience). As regards the age, which can be considered as a proxy of 
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experience and expertise, the unemployment rate of people over the age of 
forty is equal to 5,9 %, compared to 19,2% of those people less than forty, 
and this difference exists at any educational level.  
 
4. Synthesis of the probit estimates results 
Data used for the empirical evidence have been drawn from the sixth 
wave (concerning 1999) of the ECHP Eurostat Survey, dealing with Italy, 
and from Labour Forces ISTAT survey for the same period. Trying to 
understand what determines the worker’s probability of training on the job, 
a probit model for the training incidence has been estimates as follows: 
[ ] ( )âZ'F== 1Pr Tob  
where the binary independent variable assumes the following values: 
T = 1 if the worker have done training on the job  
T = 0 otherwise; 
and where the independent variables Z explain the worker’s personal 
characteristics, the job position, and the labour market situation in the 
macro-area where he works4,  b   is a vector of parameters and  f  is the 
standard distribution. In order to avoid bias in the estimates, the sample 
provided by Eurostat has been selected so to consider only workers from 16 
to 60 years old, whom, in the considered period, have worked from 15 to 60 
hours per week (see Brunello, 2001). The descriptive statistics of the used 
variables are shown in tab. 5, while probit estimates results are synthesized 
in schedules 6.a and 6.b. 
                                                 
4  See Appendix for the variables description. 
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Tab. 5 upholds the strong gap among labour markets situation in 
northern and central region (especially in North East regions) and in 
southern regions previously shown. Beyond an employment rate 18 terms in 
percentage higher in North East in comparison with the southern regions 
(tab. 3), the data of the sample show a different distribution of workers by 
kind of firm, productive sector and type of employment contract. In 
particular in the North East there is a lower percentage of workers in firms 
with over 500 employees (big firm), in the services sector and in the public 
sector, as well as a higher percentage of individuals with permanent 
employment. 
The lower precariousness of employment in the labour markets of the 
North East, in comparison with those of the South, is confirmed by the 
different percentages of unemployed/long term unemployed before current 
job, while the greater difficulties of southern young people to enter the 
labour market would be confirmed by the lower general experience, by the 
higher percentage of employees at their first job and by the smaller 
percentage of employees with “recent” certificate of education5. 
In the North East regions there is a better occupational condition and 
higher wage levels, both monthly and hourly, than in the South. Moreover 
the northern wage distribution is more homogeneous, like is pointed out by 
the Kaitz index and by the other indicators of wage dispersion6.  
                                                 
5 . For the definition of “recent” certificate of education, see Appendix. 
6 See Appendix for the detail of the used indicators of dispersion. It is useful however to 
notice that the difference between the median of the incomes distribution of “skilled” and 
“unskilled” on macro-area level, confirms that investments in human capital could signify 
for people living in the South a comparatively more efficient means, in comparison with the 
other regions, to improve their monetary and non monetary work conditions, as already 
shown by Rossetti, Tanda, 2001 and Ghignoni 2002. 
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With regard to human capital and training in the two compared macro-
areas we see that the average number of years spent in education is lower 
than the national average both in North East and in South/Islands. This 
datum, with the other ones described in tab. 3, from which we notice that the 
percentage of individuals among the workforce with at least an upper 
secondary degree (or a tertiary degree) is lower in the North East than in 
Southern Italy, (respectively: 27.2% against 30% for the upper secondary 
degree and 8.1% against 9.6% for the tertiary degree), confirming that the 
level of the basic human capital investment is not particularly high in the 
North-East nor in the South. Although, individuals in the North-East  hoard 
a lower basic human capital, we notice however, that the percentage of 
employed people who have been in training on the job is definitely higher in 
the North-East rather than in the rest of Italy and, in particular, in the 
southern regions (22% against 5.4%). 
This fact seems not to be in line with the hypothesis of the complementarity 
between education and training, now an acquired result by most of the 
empirical and theoretical literature on this matter (see, among the others, 
Montanino, 2001; Carillo 2001; Brunello, 2001; Peraita, 2001; Ariga, and 
Brunello, 2002), at least as to the western developed countries. In this 
matter, the hypothesis which we try to verify empirically in the following 
pages is that the training activity supplied by the firms is actually addressed 
to those most provided with basic human capital individuals, so agreeing 
with the hypothesis of the complementarity between education and training. 
But also that, as we shown in the previous theoretical model, the 
unemployment rates, the wage levels and the different levels of inequality in 
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the wage distribution have an important role in determining both the firms’ 
supply and the workers’ training on the job demand. A summary of the 
results of the estimate of the various probit models is quoted in schedules 
6.a and 6.b.1-6.b.2. 
 
Tab. 5 – Descriptive statistics (mean or percentage) of sample data 
Macro-areas Variables 
North West North East Centre  South -Islands  
Age 36.88 36.41 38.03 39.76 
Males 54.7% 54.9% 58.2% 65.3% 
Married 62.0% 60.3% 64.7% 71.0% 
Generic experience 16.75 17.57 17.37 16.58 
Employed at their first job 25.5% 22.3% 22.8% 34.1% 
Specific experience 9.35 9.65 9.50 10.71 
Unemployed before current job 27.5% 26.2% 33.0% 39.5% 
Unempl. for one year/more before current job 14.3% 8.3% 18.3% 28.7% 
Years of education 12.24 11.83 12.05 11.93 
“Recent” certificate of education 31.7% 30.3% 26.9% 22.4% 
Good health conditions 72.5% 74.4% 72.7% 72.8% 
Have been in training 15.7% 22.0% 11.1% 5.4% 
Monthly wage (thousand of Liras)  2036.22 1948.70 1930.47 1795.50 
Hours worked per week 37.95 37.48 38.07 37.14 
Hourly wage 13.62 13.28 12.91 12.70 
Kaitz Index 0.26 0.40 0.24 0.19 
Differential between the median (log) wages 
of skilled and unskilled workers 
0.1790 0.1272 0.1713 0.2472 
Difference between 90th and 10th percentile 0.8134 0.7658 0.8049 1.0918 
Individuals with permanent employment 88.2% 91.5% 86.8% 76.4% 
Employed in firms with more than 500 
dependents 
11.9% 8.1% 9.9% 9.5% 
Employed in the industrial sector 39.0% 35.3% 33.4% 24.1% 
Employed in the services sector 57.8% 59.8% 59.9% 64.8% 
Employed in the public sector 28.6% 29.8% 29.6% 41.6% 
N 1096 614 1181 1903 
Source: Eurostat 1999. For a wider description of variables see Appendix 
 
To balance the numbers of the explanatory variables with the 
numerousness of the reference sample (4794 individuals of which 579 have 
already done training) we preferred to limit the number of variables 
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introduced in the estimates, choosing the  most important ones to test the 
hypothesis of the shown theoretical model7. 
The education/training complementarity hypothesis seems to be 
confirmed, since getting training on the job is more likely for the individuals 
with an upper secondary or a tertiary degree compared to those who have a 
lower education (see models (a), (e), (f), (g) and (h)). The models (b), (c) 
and (d), instead of the dummies per degree, consider the average studying 
years of the individuals and seem to confirm that the probability of 
receiving training on the job is directly proportional to the basic human 
capital owned by an individual. Among the variables that describe the 
personal characteristics of the individual, the dummy “bad health 
conditions” seems to have a very negative effect on the probability of 
receiving training. Likely the firms prefer to invest in more “reliable” 
working people, with less probability of absenteeism. In this way the health 
is included in the individual “human capital” in a wider sense. 
Some of the estimated models show, as Brunello (2001) underlined, 
that sometimes training on the job could be a “recovery” of the basic human 
capital depreciation. Actually it seems that the probability of being in 
training is lower, if not for people who have a recent degree (see model (b)), 
at least for people at their first working experience (see model (c))8. It is 
interesting to notice how the dummy “first employment” loses significance 
                                                 
7 By the way in all the estimated models (see tab. 6) the coefficient of the constant is 
significant but not so high to make us think to excessive problems of relevant variables’ 
omission. 
8 Actually it is very likely that first job workers are the same who have more recent degrees. 
In fact when the two variables are included at the same time in the estimates (see models (a) 
and (d)) they seem to get significance away each other. For this reason in the models (b) 
and (c) these two variables have been included one by one. 
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when another dummy that considers the type of employment contract 
(“permanent employment”) is put in the estimate. In fact, from previous 
empirical researches (see Brunello, 2001) it results that the firms are 
inclined to privilege the training of permanent workers and that most of the 
hiring of the individuals at their first labour experience happens with 
different contractual ways. 
Even accepting the hypothesis of complementarity, we should notice 
how the probability of being trained on the job is really higher for the 
workers in the North East regions (an area in which the individual basic 
human capital is not very high) compared with the other Italian regions, 
especially compared with the Southern ones and the islands (see models (a), 
(b), (c) and (d)). A similar result is not new in literature. Brunello (2001) 
maintains that a clear and univocal relationship between the percentage of 
people in training and the share of people who have high degrees does not 
exist9. Obviously there are other variables that interact with the basic 
educational level in determining the individuals’ and firms’ training choice. 
Trying to clarify, some variables, which describe the local labour markets’ 
situation, have been added in the following models. 
The model (e) shows how the introduction of such variables in the 
estimate causes to the territorial dummies the loss of most of their 
significance, and let us suppose that they are “screen” variables, which hide 
the acting of different mechanisms. Then, in the estimate of the models (f), 
                                                 
9 For instance, Denmark has a percentage of trained workers at least double in regard to 
Belgium, as if with a very similar percentage of third level educated individuals. On the 
other side in Greece a very low workers’ share is interested in training, even if the 
workforce as to education is very similar to the United Kingdom, where the trained 
workers' percentage is much higher. 
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(g) and (h) the territorial dummies have been removed and we have 
considered only the effect on the training probability of the individuals’ 
basic human capital and of the variables that characterize the labour markets 
at a single macro-area level. Once again, the results confirm the hypothesis 
of complementarity between education and training, but they stress a very 
negative influence of the unemployment rate on the training probability and 
a very positive effect of a lower wage inequality. The variables that 
summarise the training expense at a local level seem to be of little 
significance. 
The sign of the estimated coefficient for the Kaitz index (see model 
(e)), agrees with the forecasts of the training models in the imperfect labour 
markets by Acemoglu-Pischke (1998): according to them the wage 
compression should increase the firms’ convenience to finance training 
activities for their own workers.  
Actually, in spite of the theoretical expectations, the empirical studies 
on this matter have not reached a univocal result yet.  
Among the others, Peraita (2001) refuses that such a relationship is 
good for Spain10, while Brunello (2002) and Bassanini, Brunello (2003) 
maintain that there is a positive relationship between wage compression and 
training for the European countries. 
                                                 
10 But in this case the empirical test results should be upheld further on. It is assumed that, 
even if in Spain the difference between the 90th and the 10th percentile of logarithmic 
distribution of the workers’ monthly net wage is much lower than the other European 
countries’ one, the most of workers who get training is concentrated in the highest deciles 
of the wage distribution. It looks like to mean simply that training is concentrated among 
workers with higher wage levels (and probably training helps to increase the level of skilled 
workers’ wages), and it does not necessarily deny a link between wage structure 
compression and training incidence.  
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Tab. 6.a – Probit Estimates (dummies variables in bold) 
Variables Model (a) Model (b) Model (c) Model (d) 
 Coeff. b  t-ratio  Coeff. b . t-ratio  Coeff. b  t-ratio  Coeff. b  t-ratio  
Constant -0.80424 -3.724** -1.6107 -18.861** -1.6376 -18.896** -1.6397 -18.861** 
Individuals characteristics and kind of occupation 
M_Areas          
N-W -0.28923 -3.893** -0.29881 -4.058** -0.29806 -4.048** -0.29864 -4.056** 
Centre -0.47829 -6.302** -0.49684 -6.597** -0.49606 -6.588** -0.49916 -6.624** 
S-I -0.90900 -11.835** -0.93043 -12.344** -0.93129 -12.355** -0.94120 -12.417** 
Male  -0.88E-01 -1.627        
Married  0.152E-01 0.250        
Age -0.70E-02 -1.651        
Years_Ed   0.740E-01 13.859** 0.718E-01 14.008** 0.733E-01 13.592** 
EDU          
E2 10.396 12.304**        
E3 0.62619 10.083**        
Recent -0.55E-01 -0.684 -0.77E-01 -1.366   -0.54E-01 -0.868 
G_Exp -0.97E-05 -0.094        
S_exp. 0.828E-04 0.719        
Health  -0.16E-02 -3.135** -0.16E-02 -3.204** -0.16E-02 -3.200** -0.17E-02 -3.212** 
Hours  -0.32E-02 -0.941        
Public  -0.88E-04 -0.262        
Industry 0.177E-03 0.759       
Big firm  -0.54E-04 -0.173        
Per_emp -0.40E-04 -0.280     -0.16E-03 -1.201 
First job -0.11E-03 -0.588   -0.11E-03 -1.988* -0.96E-04 -1.627 
Unempl  -0.27E-03 -1.135        
Unemp_1 0.194E-03 1.186       
**: significant  at 1%; *: significant at 5% 
Source:  Eurostat, Istat, e Isfol 1999, variables description in Appendix 
 
The result obtained by including the Kaitz Index in the estimates is also 
confirmed by using as regressors 1) the difference between the median of 
the logarithm distribution of the skilled people hourly wage and the one of 
the unskilled people (see model (g)) and 2) the difference between the 90° 
and the 10° percentile of the regional logarithm distribution of the hourly 
wage (see model (h)).  
Moreover, the models (g) and (h) point out how the percentage of the 
labour force with a secondary school degree in the local labour markets, 
could influence negatively the training probability. The complementarity 
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between education and training, should exist at an individual level but, as to 
the complexity of the involved variables, it could not be valid at an 
aggregate level. 
 
Tab. 6.b.1 – Probit Estimates, (dummies variables in bold) 
Model (e) Model (f) Variables 
Coeff. b  t-ratio  Coeff. b  t-ratio  
Constant -1,1641 -1,878 -1,7465 -4,873** 
Individuals characteristics and kind of occupation 
M_Areas       
N-W 0,23315E-01 0,195    
Centre -0,16281 -1,191    
S-I -0,62513 -3,696**    
Male       
Married       
Age      
Years_Ed      
EDU     
E2 10,173 12,687** 10,347 12,992** 
E3 0,69961 11,479** 0,64318 10,533** 
Recent -0,31259E-01 -0,514 0,31382E-01 0,523 
G_Exp      
S_exp.     
Health  -0,85813E-03 -1,851 -0,14419E-02 -2,748* 
Hours      
Public  -0,48596E-03 -1,476 -0,21384E-03 -0,655 
Industry 0,57808E-03 2,369* 0,22296E-03 1,004 
Big firm  0,51843E-04 0,158 0,48773E-05 0,016 
Per_emp     
First job -0,11982E-03 -2,064* -0,13102E-03 -2,233* 
Unempl      
Unemp_1         
Local labour markets 
% E2 -0,51693E-02 -0,366 -0,13198E-01 -1,330 
U_rate -0,97357E-04 -0,015 -0,20655E-01 -4,010** 
Kaitz  -1,1856 -1,560 1,6481 3,405** 
MedS_medU     
90th_ 10th      
T_exp/empl -0,67849E-01 -0,246 -0,23887 -0,903 
n°_T/empl 0,46383E-02 1,634 0,81527E-02 2,279* 
**: significant at  1%; *: significant at 5% 
Source:  Eurostat, Istat, e Isfol 1999, variables description  in  Appendix 
 
However, our estimates seem to confirm the previous theoretical 
hypothesis. 
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Tab. 6.b.2 – Probit Estimates, (dummies variables in bold)       
Model (e) Model (f) Variables 
Coeff. b  t-ratio  Coeff. b  t-ratio  
Constant -1,7077 -4,909** 0,20122 0,449 
Individuals characteristics and kind of occupation 
M_Areas      
N-W     
Centre     
S-I     
Male      
Married      
Age     
Years_Ed     
EDU     
E2 10,251 12,847** 1,041 13,045** 
E3 0,64038 10,464** 0,64279 10,523** 
Recent 0,33186E-01 0,552 2,66E-02 0,444 
G_Exp     
S_exp.     
Health  -0,14799E-02 -2,838* -1,46E-03 -2,791* 
Hours      
Public  -0,20565E-03 -0,638 -1,72E-04 -0,526 
Industry 0,22736E-03 1,030 2,22E-04 1,001 
Big firm  -0,10992E-04 -0,036 -5,40E-05 -0,174 
Per_emp     
First job -0,13597E-03 -2,317* -1,43E-04 -2,432* 
Unempl      
Unemp_1         
Local labour markets 
% E2 0,26860E-01 2,012* -2,98E-02 -2,865* 
U_rate -0,35786E-01 -7,334** -1,67E-02 -2,988* 
Kaitz      
MedS_medU -26,351 -4,570**   
90th_ 10th    -0,95016 -4,241** 
T_exp/empl -0,22045 -0,889 -0,11926 -0,461 
n°_T/empl 0,76186E-02 2,793* 3,17E-03 1,086 
**: significative at 1%; *: significative at 5% 
Source:  Eurostat, Istat, e Isfol 1999, variables description in Appendix 
 
According to them, with low unemployment rates, the firms could 
consider convenient to support the training costs even for the individuals 
with a low basic human capital. In this case, the firm could increase the 
productivity of the individuals with a lower basic education to whom, 
because of the positive employment situation, the firm should be obliged to 
pay quite high wages. Such an incentive would not exist in some areas 
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where the high unemployment (especially among the workers with a low 
human capital) contributes to keep the wages low. In this case, the wage 
inequality between the skilled and the unskilled workers, can make not 
convenient for the firm trying to increase the productivity of low educated 
people by the training on the job. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigated the uneven distribution of workers’ 
training among Italian regions. Two not alternative explanations have been 
proposed at a theoretical level and tested by econometric estimates, referring 
to the complementarity between education and training and to the effects of 
unemployment. Some authors have already argued that education and 
training are complements in the sense that knowledge acquired by education 
facilitates learning and helps to valorise the further skills gained on the job. 
Nonetheless, the evidence shows that regions with a similar educational 
level can have a very different percentage of trained workers. Therefore it 
seems to be clear that complementarity is not sufficient to explain the 
complex mechanism that causes training incidence. The second explanation 
regards the effect of regional unemployment on firms’ and workers’ choices 
of training investments. The hypothesis is that as regional unemployment 
rate affects the unskilled/skilled wage differential and, consequently, the 
incentives to training. If unemployment is low, even for the unskilled 
workers, the unskilled wage tends to be high and the differential between 
skilled and unskilled wage quite low. In that case, the firms is boosted to 
provide training even to the relatively less educated workers. The contrary is 
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expected to happen in regions with high unemployment. The examined data 
and Probit estimates confirm the complementarity effect, as workers with an 
higher basic human capital has more probability to enter training. At the 
same time they show a strong influence of both the unemployment rate and 
the wage compression indicators on the training incidence. In a few words, 
educational level appear to be more important in deciding to which workers 
the firm has to offer an opportunity of training, whereas unemployment rate 
and wage compression affect the decision of how many workers making this 
offer. The unemployment effect found out by this paper confirms that, as it 
has been pointed out by most recent developments of human capital 
literature, the incentive for firms to pay for general training depends on the 
level of wage compression. Notwithstanding, it represents an original result, 
as compression in this model doesn’t depend on institutional factors, as 
usually assumed in the literature, but on the dependence of unskilled wage 
on regional unemployment. The reached results suggest some interesting 
policy implications. First, the existence of complementarity between 
education and training give us the idea of how an increase of people’s 
average educational level could set in motion a “virtuous circle” able to 
increase the workforce’s total human capital, with strong benefits both at 
individual and at local economic system level. This can be really important 
both in the perspective of lifelong learning and in a context of policies 
aimed at reducing social exclusion. Secondly, we can maintain that the 
relationship between training and regional unemployment makes urgent, 
overall in the South of Italy, a deeper coordination of training policies and 
local development structural policies. Thirdly, our results put in evidence 
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that it is possible that labour policies based on wage flexibility could 
depress training investments, threatening to lower the skill requirements of 
the economy with a negative impact on the problem of employment quality. 
 
Appendix  -  Data and variables description 
T: the dependent variable in the probit estimate was built giving value 1 to all the 
individuals who answered to question PT002 of the Eurostat questioner (Have you been in 
education or training since January last year? And, if yes, which kind of course(s) was it?) 
that they have done Vocational and/or Training and/or Language courses, and value 0 
otherwise. Obviously, being about training courses, we are considering only the “formal” 
training activity.  Another limit of the available data source is that it does not allowed us to 
find the financing source of the training. The question PT017 (Was the vocational 
education course “paid for” or “organised by” the employer) was considered ambiguous 
and difficult to use even from others authors (Bassanini, Brunello 2003). 
Macro-area (M_areas): series of dummies variables built on the basis of the question 
HG015 by grouping the 11 regions considered by Eurostat in 4 “macro-areas”: North West, 
North East (dummies reference), Centre, South/Islands. 
Generic Experience (G_exp): variable built on the basis of the questions PD003 (Age) and 
PE039 (How old were you when you began your working life?) in that way:     
PE039  -  PD003  Experience  Generic =  
Specific Experience (S_exp): variable built on the basis of the question PE011 (year of 
start of current job): PE011 -  interview  the  of  year   Experience Specific =   
Years of education (Years_ed): variable built on the basis of question PT022, giving to 
every certificate of education the number of years necessary to get it, that is 20 years for 
ISCED 5-7; 13 years for ISCED 3; 8 years for ISCED 0-2. 
Certificate of education (EDU): dummies variables built on the basis of question PT022 
(Highest level of general or higher education completed). E2 (upper secondary level = 
ISCED 3), E3 (tertiary level = ISCED 5-7), dummy reference: not more than compulsory 
level; 
“Recent” certificate of education (Recent): dummy variable built on the basis of questions 
PD003 (Age) and PT023 (Age when the highest level of general or higher education was 
completed) as follows:    PT023  -  PD003    education of ecertificat the of  Seniority"" =  
Afterwards we computed the quartiles of the distribution of the “Seniority” variable and we 
considered “Recent” the qualifications got since a number of years lower or equal to the 
first quartile of such distribution (11 years). 
Bad health conditions (Health): dummy variable built on the basis of the question PH001 
(How is your health in general?) giving value 0 if the individual has answered: very good, 
good, fair and value 1 if the individual has answered bad, very bad. 
Unemployed before present job (Unempl): dummy variable built on the basis of question 
PE014 (Existence of an unemployment period before current job?). 
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Unemployed for one year or more before the present job (Unemp_1): dummy variable 
built on the basis of question PE015 (Number of months of continuous unemployment 
before current job). 
Monthly wage: variable built on the basis of the question PI211M (Current wage and 
salary earnings- net, monthly). 
Hours working per week (Hours): variable built on the basis of the question PE005 (Total 
number of hours working per week). 
Hourly wage:   
 weekper  workingHours  4
 wagenetMonthly 
    geHourly  wa
´
=  
Kaitz index: variable calculated on hourly wages (considering the presence of eventual 
outliers), in a disaggregate way for the 11 Eurostat regions, 
  wageaverage
  wageminimum
  indexKaitz   =  
If the minimum wage is very far from the average (and therefore the wage distribution is 
very unequal) the index has a low value. If the wage distribution is equal and the minimum 
wage is equal to the average wage, the index reaches its maximum value, equal to 1. 
Differential between the median (log) wages of skilled and unskilled workers 
(MedS_medU): the variable has been built calculating the difference, for each Eurostat 
region, between the median of the distribution of the logarithm of hourly skilled wages and 
the median of the distribution of the logarithm of hourly unskilled wages. The higher is the 
value of this index, the higher is wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. 
Difference between 90th and 10th percentile (90th_10th): the variable has been built for 
each Eurostat region, calculating the difference between 90th and 10th percentile of the 
regional distribution of the logarithm of hourly wages. The higher is this difference, the 
higher is local wage inequality. 
Permanent employment (Per_emp): dummy variable built on the basis of the question 
PE024 (What type of employment contract do you have in your main job). 
% E2  = percentage of upper secondary level of education in labour force at local level. 
Unemployment rate at local level (U_rate), Istat 1999. 
Training expenditure/employment at local level (T_exp/empl), Isfol 1999. 
Number of workers in training/employment at local level (n°_T/empl), Isfol 1999. 
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